So, Cheyue's strategy has a lot to recommend it. Nonetheless, his argument does not succeed in defeating, or even denting, platonism. That this is so is the focus of the next section.
Cheyne's Argument
Cheyne puts his argument thus:
CE We cannot know that Fs exist unless our belief in their existence is caused by at least one event in which an F participates.
C2 Platonic objects cannot participate in events. Therefore:
C3 We cannot know that platonic objects exist, (p. 38) What does 'participate' mean in the premises? Cheyne provides only a necessary condition for such participation: namely, that if an entity e participates in some event, then e has causal powers. 4 Accordingly, Cheyne's second premise, C2, is true-indeed, true by definition. As Cheyne puts it, '[pjlatonic objects, since they lack causal powers, cannot participate in events ' (p. 36) .
Accordingly, the key premise in Cheyne's argument is CE, and his argument stands or falls with CE. If Cheyne establishes CE then his argument would show that platonism is untenable. But, as the next two subsections show, Cheyne does not establish CE, and so his argument leaves platonism untouched. Cheyne gives two different arguments for CE. I treat each in turn.
History of Science
Cheyne's first and major argument for CE is an appeal to the history of scientific practice. Cheyne gives four interesting examples from the history of science: namely, the story of Mendeleeff's discovery of germanium, the discovery of the top quark at Fermilab (Chicago), the use of PEGGY II (a polarizing electron gun) to confirm the existence of electrons, and the discovery of Neptune. In each case the pattern of discovery, as described by Cheyne, is this: An entity e is posited; however, scientists do not conclude that, e exists until they have causally interacted with e-or at least they do not claim to know that e exists until such causal interaction has transpired.
Cheyne takes his examples to illustrate that CE is true-at least of scientific practice. He puts the point thus:
Scientists are not content just to 'save the phenomena'. They continually strive to discover the existence of the entities they postualte. Consider the key element common to every example Cheyne cites: namely, the 'conviction' that leads natural scientists to expect, even require, that causal interaction should occur with the postulated entities. This raises a very important question: Why should the natural scientist expect that such entities should be able to causally interact at all? Why should the natural scientist expect her postulated entities to have causal properties?
This question may seem strange, or perhaps even silly. But the answer is important in the present context. The reason that the natural scientist expects her posited entities to exhibit causal effects is simple: Her entities were initially posited as causal entities-they were posited to play a causal role. Accordingly, the natural scientist should expect her posited entities to have causal effects because their causal effects are an essential part of her initial postulation. When Neptune was posited, it was posited as an entity rich with causal powers. Likewise with Cheyne's other examples. This is precisely the reason that natural scientists busily attempt to causally interact with their posited entities -their entities, by postulation (as it were), are expected to exhibit causal effects.
Notice, however, that it is precisely this 'conviction' of the natural scientist that makes CE non _ naturiU implausible. Prima facie, such 'conviction', at least with respect to causal activity, is not the way matters stand in maths, logic, or etc. Suppose that a mathematician posits imaginary numbers, or that, a semanticist postulates acausal entities (propositions, or whatever). Should we expect to see either the mathematician or the semanticist busily attempting to build the analogue of PEGGY II-perhaps a 'proposition gun', or t-o-meter (to detect the causal activity of imaginary numbers), or the like? Not at all. But why not?
The reason we shouldn't expect to see proposition guns, t-o-meters, or the like, is that neither imaginary numbers nor propositions (or whatever) are posited as causal entities. These sorts of entity, unlike the entities involved in Cheyne's examples, are not posited to fill some causal explanatory gap; they are not posited with causal powers at all. And for this reason, nobody is troubled when mathematicians, or logicians, or semanticists, etc., spend their time with pencil and paper instead of proposition-guns or t-ometers.
The point is simple but important. The very feature of his examples that provides reason to accept CEnatm-ai-namely, the conviction that causal interaction will occur-is the very feature that provides reason to reject CE non ., ialural . Accordingly, contrary to Cheyne's claim, we do have special grounds for rejecting his existential causal condition in mathematics (and other non-natural sciences).
In short, then, the trouble with Cheyne's first argument for CE can be put as follows. Cheyne intends to use examples from the history of science to establish his key premise CE. Unfortunately, his examples come exclusively from natural science, and so at best only CE naturtt i is established. But there is more to science than natural science. In addition to CE na turai Cheyne must also establish CEpo,..^.,..^. Examples from natural science alone cannot establish CE non . natura j. Since Cheyne provides only examples from natural science, his argument from the history of science fails to establish CE. What is worse is that, as above, Cheyne's case for CE nat urai seeins to undermine CE non . nat uriii • But, then, there is little hope at all of establishing CE by appeal to the history of natural science.
For these reasons, I think that Cheyne's first argument for CE is not a good one. Unfortunately, his first argument is his most extensive argument. Nonetheless, he does offer another one to which I now briefly turn.
The Hart Argument
Cheyne's second case for CE simply borrows an argument from W. D. Hart [1977] , which he quotes thus:
Granted just conservation of energy, when you learn something about an object, there is a change in you [which] can be accounted for only by some sort of transmission of energy from, ultimately, your environment to your brain. And I do not see how what you learned can be about that object (rather than some other) unless at least part of the energy that changed your state came from that object, (p. 125, quoted in Cheyne, p. 41) This argument, I think, is suspicious from the start, especially so if it is used as an argument for CE. In particular, note the main premise, namely, H If you learn something about an object, then you (or your brain) causally interact with the object. On the surface H would seem to have well known counterexamples. After all, I have learned a great, great deal about The Easter Bilby. I have also learned a great deal about Pegasus. In both cases, this is genuine learning; however, in neither case have I causally interacted with the object concerned.
8 Accordingly, the main premise of Hart's argument seems to be false. 0 The problems with Hart's position may even be more serious, but I leave this aside. For discussion, however, see Steiner [1978] , in which Steiner argues that an ignorance of physics is required to think that one can't learn about an object without energy from that object reaching one. (I am grateful to a referee report for this point.)
If Cheyne is going to use Hart's argument as an argument for CE then he must avoid the problem above. How does Cheyne avoid the problem? His response runs as follows:
It is clear that Hart is using 'about' in a sense which means that 'I know about an object' entails the existence of the object concerned. If he is right, then [CE is true]. Learning something 'about' a particular object in this sense entails learning that at least one object of a certain kind exists, and the existential causal condition CE follows, (p. 41) There are two problems with this argument. The first problem is its presupposition that there is a sense of 'I learn about x' that entails the existence of x. In other words, Cheyne claims that, where a is any singular term, there is a sense of r I learn about a" 1 such that existential generalisation on a is (necessarily) truth-preserving. 10 But what 'sense' is this? Cheyne doesn't say; he says only that there is such a sense. But this is hardly sufficient, especially in the face of strong argument to the contrary. Consider, for example, the following.
Let d be any contingently existing entity. Let w be some non-actual world at which d doesn't exist. Suppose, now, that, at to, Greg learns that d doesn't exist. Then at w 'Greg learns something about d' is true but l d exists' is false. (After all, learning that d doesn't exist is learning something about d.) But, then, there is a world at which 'Greg learns something about d' is true but 'd exists' is false. Equivalently: 'Greg learns about x' does not entail the existence of the object concerned. Hence, unless the range of 'x' is restricted only to necessary entities, 'Greg learns about x' does not entail the existence of x, which is to say that 'Greg learns about x' is intensional.
11
Of course, one might come up with objections to this 'proof that 'I learn about x' is intensional. In the end, however, this is more to the point. In short, Cheyne's second argument for CE simply assumes that there is no problem in invoking an extensional sense of 'I learn about 1'. At the very least, the 'proof serves to show that Cheyne must do more than merely assume such extensionality; he must argue for it.
For now, put the intensionality issue aside. There is another problem with Cheyne's Hart argument for CE.
The problem is straightforward. Grant, for the sake of argument, that there is some sense of 'I learn about x' that entails the existence of the object concerned. Cheyne says (in effect) that if Hart's main premise is correct, then CE follows. This, of course, is correct. But what reason has been given to think that Hart's main premise is correct? Cheyne gives none.
12 And for this reason, Cheyne's Hart argument for CE fails.
3. Summary I have argued that Cheyne's (only) two arguments for CE fail to provide reason to accept CE. What is more, Cheyne's mam argument for accepting CE results in a reason to reject CE-this being the conspicuous absence of 'conviction' in non-natural science. Given that Cheyne's argument against platonism rests entirely on CE, I conclude that Cheyne's argument leaves platonism intact. 
